

on, or guarded against it—that is how affairs are conducted here. Aeschines was nominated a delegate to the [Amphictyonic] council; three or four people held up their hands for him, and he was declared elected.” Aeschines exploited the thoughtlessness and inattention of the assembly and, like Lamachus, was elected to office by a small minority. Demosthenes gained his end with shrewd timing and by employing the tactic of surprise.

Maneuvers such as these give substance to the Old Oligarch’s charge; they also explain the difficulty of the “many witnesses” which Dover, and Classen–Steup before him, saw in Nicias’ peroration. In order to escape the accusation of having rescinded the enactment with a few votes, it was important for the *prytanis* to have a majority of the assembly with him or, as the Greek literally and more precisely says, to have them *on his side* (μετὰ τοσῶνδ’ μαρτύρων). The greater the majority, in fact, the better, for the chairman’s safety was in the numbers. Hence Nicias’ remark that with so many witnesses the *prytanis* has nothing to fear.

Understood in this way, Nicias’ words and the blunt criticism of the Old Oligarch shed an unexpected light on a less admirable side of political life in late fifth-century Athens. They tell us something else besides, namely, that the risk that the presiding officer of the Athenian assembly ran in the performance of his duties formed a topic of not inconsiderable debate in the last decades of the century. The two passages neatly complement each other: the statement in Pseudo-Xenophon represents the general and theoretical formulation of the topos, for which Nicias in his speech provides the specific and practical illustration. The two passages also permit us a glimpse of the diametrically opposed arguments which could be employed in the same political situation. The aristocrat sees in the Athenian *demos* a dissolute and irresponsible mob seeking a single scapegoat for its own decisions: an assembly of liars ready to invent a myriad of excuses with which to repudiate their solemn agreements.⁵ The democratic leader before the assembly should regard his fellow Athenians (so argues Nicias) as responsible and upright citizens to whose patriotic judgment he can appeal, and as men capable of calm and rational deliberation, willing to accept advice, who loyally support the president in his efforts to undo a bad decision.⁶

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5. Cf. the remainder of [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2, 17.

6. This practice of looking at the same thing from two opposing points of view was very much a part of the intellectual climate of the day. Cf. the *Dissoi Logoi* (Diels–Kranz, *Vorsokr.* 2²:405–16) and Antiphon *Tetralogies* 2, 3, 4.

THEOPHRASTUS FRAGMENT 70D: LESS, NOT MORE

In his expanded collection of Theophrastean fragments, F. Wimmer included as 70d a short excerpt from the commentary of Gregory of Corinth (*RhGr* vol. 7.2, p. 1154. 22–25 Walz) on Hermogenes’ *De methodo* 5 (*RhGr* vol. 6, p. 418.

17 Rabe): κατὰ γὰρ τὸν Θεόφραστον γνώμη ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφανσις ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις, εἰσὶ δὲ τούτων αἱ μὲν παράδοξοι, αἱ δὲ ἐνδοξοί, αἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητούμεναι.¹ The excerpt contains two parts: (1) Theophrastus' definition of the maxim as a general statement concerning matters of conduct; and (2) the assertion that some maxims are paradoxical, others in agreement with accepted opinion, and still others disputed. My worry here is with the length of the excerpt, for once part 2 is included, there seems little reason to cut off the fragment at the point Wimmer does. Hence, G. Rosenthal has argued that the Theophrastean fragment actually runs twelve lines longer (1154. 22–1155. 8) and is an example of the way Theophrastus develops in greater detail a matter already discussed by Aristotle: the enigmatic saying of Stesichorus quoted by Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 2. 21 1395a1–2 (= *PMG* no. 281, p. 140. 15–17) is explained and a tripartite division of the maxim is substituted for Aristotle's bipartite analysis.²

Rosenthal's argument is attractive and has influenced all subsequent scholarship. A. Mayer, for example, prints the fuller version,³ and O. Regenbogen speaks of Theophrastus' beloved tripartition.⁴ Even G. M. A. Grube, who is rightly unhappy with previous work on Theophrastus' rhetoric, accepts Rosenthal's addition to fragment 70d and uses this addition to argue for a close relationship between Theophrastus and Aristotle.⁵ There are, however, reasons for caution. First, the material which follows upon Theophrastus' definition of the maxim is so closely related to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (2. 21) that one may doubt that the material is Theophrastean at all. Second and more important, we know that Gregory followed a source shared by John the Deacon, who also composed a commentary on Hermogenes' *De methodo*. Since Gregory often found this common source too full and therefore cut out material preserved by John, we should look at John's text, to see whether he offers not only a fuller version but also one which can help us decide what material is Theophrastean and what is not.

John's commentary is preserved in codex Vaticanus Gr. 2228. It has been studied by H. Rabe,⁶ but the relevant portion (f. 428^v vv. 9–34) has not previously been published. I offer it here, beginning with the lemma from Hermogenes and running to the end of John's comment on this piece of text.⁷ To facilitate comparison with Gregory, I have adopted parallel columns: John on the left and Gregory on the right. The text of John is continuous. That of Gregory is broken up (reflecting omissions), and one segment has been moved forward, in order to appear opposite the corresponding portion of John's text (1154. 29–1155. 1 = John 22–26). I have occasionally departed from Walz's punctuation, and the use of parallel columns has prevented me from indenting lines taken from Euripides *Medea* 294–97 and *Hecuba* 863–67. These lines are enclosed in quotation marks (31–33, 34–37 and 38–39, 40–43).

1. *Theophrastus: Opera omnia* (Paris, 1866), p. 432.

2. "Ein vergessenes Theophrastfragment," *Hermes* 32 (1897): 317–20.

3. *Theophrasti Περὶ λέξεως libri fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1910), p. 143.

4. "Theophrast," *RE Suppl.* 7 (1940): 1524.

5. "Theophrastus as a Literary Critic," *TAPA* 83 (1952): 174.

6. "Aus den Rhetoren-Handschriften," *RhM* 63 (1908): 127–51.

7. My colleague M. Sollenberger has done a great deal of work on cod. Vat. Gr. 2228 in general and on this portion of text in particular. I am extremely grateful for his assistance.

JOHN

GREGORY

- “οἱ δὲ καθολικοὶ λόγοι δηλον
ὅ τί ποτέ εἰσιν.” ἐπειδὴ
πάντες οἶδασιν, ὅτι γινῶμαι
εἰσιν οἱ καθολικοὶ λόγοι, διὰ
5 τοῦτο παρήκεν εἰπεῖν. δηλον
γάρ, ὅτι γινώμας πάντες τοὺς
λόγους τοὺς καθολικοὺς ὀνομάζ-
ουσιν. ἐν τῇ Πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον
ῥητορικῇ Ἀριστοτέλους οὕτω
10 τὴν γνώμην ὀρίζεται· “γνώμη
ἐστὶ καθ’ ὅλων τῶν πραγμάτων
ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δόγματος ἰδίου
δήλωσις.” ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος οὕτω
τὴν γνώμην ὀρίζεται· “γνώμη
15 ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν
τοῖς πρακτικοῖς.” ἔστι δὲ
πλείω μέρη τῆς γνώμης· καὶ
τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παράδοξα, τὰ δὲ
ἐνδοξα, τὰ δὲ ἀμφισβητούμενα.
20 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν εἰσι παράδοξοι
ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενοι, δεῖ ταύταις
καὶ ἀποδείξω, καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ
μὲν εἰσιν αἱ προεγνωσμέναι·
διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν δέονται ἐπιλόγων
25 αἱ τοιαῦται· οἷον, ἀνδρὶ δ’
ὕγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν, ὥς γε
μοῖ δοκεῖ· φαίνεται γὰρ τοῖς
πολλοῖς οὕτως. αἱ δὲ παράδοξοι,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, δέονται καὶ
30 κατασκευῶν· οἷα ἐστὶν αὕτη·
“χρὴ δ’ οὐποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων
πέφυκ’ ἀνὴρ / παῖδας περισσῶς
ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σοφούς.” εἴτα ἡ
αἰτία καὶ κατασκευή· “χωρὶς
35 γὰρ ἄλλης ἥς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας /
φθόνον παρ’ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι
δυσμενῇ.” καὶ πάλιν ἐν Ἑκάβῃ·
“φεῦ, φεῦ· / οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν
ὅστις ἔστ’ ἐλεύθερος.” εἴτα ἡ
40 κατασκευή· “ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ
δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης, / ἢ πληθος
ἀστῶν ἢ νόμων γραφαὶ / εἴργουσι
χρῆσθαι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην
τρόποις.”
τῶν δὲ μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ
45 καὶ ἀμφιβόλων προστιθέντα
δὴ τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα
λέγειν. χρηστέον δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοι-
ούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἀποφθέγμασι
τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς· οἷον εἴ τις
- “οἱ δὲ καθολικοὶ λόγοι δηλον
ὅ τί ποτέ εἰσιν.” ἐπειδὴ
πάντες οἶδασιν, ὅτι γινῶμαι
εἰσιν οἱ καθολικοὶ λόγοι, διὰ
τοῦτο παρήκεν εἰπεῖν. δηλον
γάρ, ὅτι γινώμας τοὺς λόγους
πάντες τοὺς καθολικοὺς ὀνομάζ-
ουσι.
κατὰ γὰρ τὸν Θεόφραστον
γνώμη
ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν
τοῖς πρακτέοις. εἰσὶ δὲ
τούτων αἱ μὲν παράδοξοι, αἱ δὲ
ἐνδοξοὶ, αἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητούμεναι.
τὰς δὲ ἐνδοξοὺς
1154. 19–25
1154. 29–1155. 1
χρὴ λέγειν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως·
οἷον, ἀνδρὶ δ’
ὕγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστι.
καὶ αἱ μὲν παράδοξοι
δέονται
κατασκευῶν· οἷα ἐστὶν αὕτη·
“χρὴ δ’ οὐποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων
πέφυκ’ ἀνὴρ / παῖδας περισσῶς
ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σοφούς.”
1154. 25–28
τῶν δὲ μὴ παραδόξων μὲν
ἀδήλων δὲ
καὶ ἀμφιβόλων προστιθέναι
δεῖ τὰς αἰτίας
σὺν ἀποφθέγμασιν·
οἷον εἴ τις
1155. 1–8

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>50 λέγοι, ὅπερ Στησίχορος εἶπεν
ἐν Λοκροῖς, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβριστάς
εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες
αὐτοῖς χαμόθεν ᾄδωσι. τοῦτο γάρ
ἄδηλον ἔστιν ἥγουν ἀμφίβολον,</p> <p>55 καὶ ἔχει τὸ τῆς συμβουλῆς
ὄφελος. διὰ τί γάρ φησιν, “οὐ
δεῖ ὑβριστάς εἶναι,” ἐὰν ὑβρίζ-
ωσι τινάς; ὅτι ἐὰν ὦσιν <οἱ>
ὑβρίζ-
όμενοι δυνατώτεροι, μεγάλη</p> <p>60 τις ἡ βλάβη ἀπαντᾷ. ἀφανίζουσι
γὰρ πᾶσαν τὴν χώραν καὶ

δενδροτομήσουσι τοσοῦτον,
ὥστε μὴδε τοὺς τέττιγας ἔχειν
ἐνθα δὴ καθεσθῆσονται καὶ
ἔσουσιν.</p> | <p>λέγει, ὅπερ Στησίχορος εἶπεν,
ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβριστάς
εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες
αὐτοῖς χαμόθεν ἀντᾷσωσιν.</p> <p>ἐὰν γὰρ ὦσιν οἱ ὑβρίζ-

οντες δυνατώτεροι,

δενδροτομήσουσι τὴν χώραν
ἅπασαν
τοσοῦτον,
ὥστε μὴδὲ τοὺς τέττιγας ἔχειν
ἐνθα καθεσθέντες ἔσουσι.</p> |
|---|--|

The text of John is on the whole sound, but certain readings should at least be mentioned. In Theophrastus' definition of the maxim, John, like Gregory, has ἀπόφασις (15) and not ἀπόφανσις, which is Wimmer's emendation, apparently based on Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1394a22. John also has πρακτικοῖς (16), which is found in one manuscript of Gregory and is to be preferred to πρακτέοις, the reading printed by Walz and Wimmer. In the quotation from Euripides' *Medea*, John's manuscript has αὐτῶν. Following *Medea* 297 and *Rhetoric* 1394a3, I have printed ἀστῶν (36). In the last portion of John's text, there are several difficulties. Where the manuscript has δὴ (46) we might better read δεῖ with Gregory. The clause ἐὰν ὑβρίζωσι τινάς (57–58) is awkward and possibly corrupt.⁸ In the immediately following sentence, adding οἱ (58) makes for clarity and is supported by Gregory's text. But if there are problems here, this last portion of text also offers help with the explanation of Stesichorus' enigmatic saying. The passive form ὑβριζόμενοι (58–59) is correct, and the active form ὑβρίζοντες found in Gregory is false. It is the victims of insolence, not the perpetrators, who when stronger engage in devastating retaliation.

Turning now to the substance of John's text, we should notice that it begins in the same way that Gregory's text does. First we are offered a lemma from Hermogenes and then are told that everyone knows that general statements are maxims (1–8). After this come two definitions of the maxim (8–16). The first is from the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 12 1430a40–b1, and the second is attributed to Theophrastus. This is a departure from Gregory, who mentions only Theophrastus and so gives the impression that Theophrastus is his source. The impression is false. Gregory and John are both following the same source, which cited two (and possibly more) definitions of the maxim. They are cited because

8. An anonymous referee makes the interesting suggestion that the clause in question is added as “an explication and expansion of ὑβριστάς designed to provide explicitly the object (τινάς) required by the sense.” This suggestion is attractive in that it saves the text, but it still leaves a basic awkwardness. Perhaps John has excerpted carelessly, or possibly the text is corrupt. Certainty here is elusive.

they make explicit mention of the general or universal, not because they were found together in some lost work of Theophrastus.

Next John, like Gregory, tells us that some maxims are paradoxical, some in agreement with accepted opinion, and some disputed (16–19). To see here a significant departure from Aristotle in the direction of tripartition is, I think, a mistake, for John immediately brings together paradoxical and disputed maxims as those in need of demonstration (20–22) and therefore different from maxims which are in agreement with accepted opinion and not in need of supplemental arguments (22–25). This is Aristotelian and is taken with only minor variation in wording from *Rhetoric* 1394b8–12. What comes next in John's text (25–28) also comes next in Aristotle: the maxim "For man health is best, as it seems at least to me" and the comment "for it appears so to most men" (1394b13–14). These lines (20–28) are, of course, partly missing in Gregory (20–22 have no parallel), and insofar as they do find a parallel, they do so at a different place (22–26 find a parallel somewhat later in 1154. 29–1155. 1, i.e., the lines that have been moved forward in the right-hand column). This may encourage the impression that Gregory is not using a source which draws on Aristotle, but if it does, the impression is wrong. John's fuller comments make this clear not only in the lines just discussed (20–28) but also in what follows: lines 31–37 should be compared with *Rhetoric* 1394a29–34, lines 38–41 with 1394b4–6, and lines 44–53 with 1394b31–1395a2.

This is not to overlook the fact that John or his source would like to be something more than a "cut and paste" commentator. Accordingly, he varies or paraphrases Aristotelian material (16–25), extends a quote from Euripides' *Hecuba* beyond the portion cited by Aristotle (41–43 = *Hec.* 866–67), and adds an explanation not found in Aristotle, namely, the explanation of Stesichorus' saying (56–64). But none of this points to Theophrastus as a primary source.⁹ Nor does failure to mention Aristotle. In fact, the abruptness with which our text moves from Theophrastus to Aristotle has an exact parallel in the immediately preceding section of John's commentary (f. 428^r v. 25–f. 428^v v. 9). This section has been published by Rabe¹⁰ and has as its topic supplemental arguments. For our purposes the important point is that John refers to Theophrastus (f. 428^r v. 38) and then without naming Aristotle introduces an extended quote from *Rhetoric* 2. 23 1398b10–19. The abruptness is confusing, so that an incautious reader might think that the Aristotelian material is derived from Theophrastus. But we can be certain that this is not the case, for the quoted material involves the same textual difficulties that are found in our manuscripts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (especially 1398b16 = f. 428^v vv. 3–4, where a lacuna seems likely).

The bottom line is that we have less Theophrastus than we once thought. We must reject not only Rosenthal's addition but also part 2 of Wimmer's fragment

9. The very last word of the extract seems especially telling because, as an anonymous referee has kindly pointed out, ῥῥοσιον is un-Attic and post-classical, and therefore not Theophrastean. Of course, commentators who excerpt from earlier authors occasionally nod and introduce a form current in their own day, but in this case such a possibility is not to be taken seriously. On the distinction between the Attic and non-Attic forms, see now R. Renehan in *CP* 80 (1985): 165–67.

10. "Rhetoren-Handschriften," pp. 137–38.

70d. This may be regrettable, but at least we still have Theophrastus' definition of the maxim.¹¹

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11. In conclusion, I want to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for supporting the research done in preparing this paper. NEH funding has been essential to all the work of Project Theophrastus and is greatly appreciated.

TO BE TAKEN WITH A PINCH OF SALT: THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE

Those who have paid more than cursory attention to the momentous events of 146 B.C. may have noticed, at least in some accounts, a strange procedure of the Romans:

Le traitement infligé à Carthage est demeuré dans la mémoire des hommes comme le plus terrible exemple de l'anéantissement total d'un peuple: la ville incendiée, les ruines détruites jusque dans leurs fondations, le sol semé de sel, les survivants vendus en esclavage, les dieux mêmes emmenés à Rome.

Thus G. Picard, one of the great specialists on Carthage.¹

It seems that this sowing of the ruins of Carthage with salt, apparently as a symbol of its total destruction and perhaps as a means of ensuring the soil's infertility, is a tradition in Roman history well known to most students. When, however, one comes to seek the source, it seems elusive. One would turn first to the most important, Polybius. This eyewitness account is unfortunately known only in fragmentary condition (38. 19–22). He tells the story of Hasdrubal and his valiant wife, then Scipio reflects on the reverses of Fortune. That is all. The epitomes of Livy's history (Book 51) offer no more. The appropriate books of Diodorus are lost—regrettably, since he had a great interest in Carthage. He says simply that the city was razed to the ground (32. 4. 5, 32. 14. 1) or that the Carthaginians were utterly obliterated (32. 26. 2), and the effects of Rome's action are discussed (34/35. 33). For the first surviving account we must wait for Appian (*Pun.* 128–35): after the week's street-fighting to capture Byrsa and the surrender of Hasdrubal, the city was given over to the troops to plunder. Some time later the commission of ten senators arrived. They decreed that no one was to live there. Appian is careful, however, to specify that the ground was not cursed.

What of later historians and epitomizers? Scipio destroyed Carthage utterly (Vell. Pat. 1. 12). Florus emphasizes only the seventeen days which the fire raged after it had been lit by the Carthaginians themselves (1. 31). Scipio *eam cepit ac diruit* (Eutrop. 4. 12). He destroyed Carthage within six months (*De vir. ill.* 58). Orosius tells also of the fire that burned for seventeen days, that every stone was

1. *Le monde de Carthage* (Paris, 1956), p. 76.